Philadelphia’s Prolonged Youth-Detention Problem: A Survey of Potential Legal Challenges

Introduction

Philadelphia’s youth detention facilities have been inadequate for decades. Ideally, these facilities house youth for short periods as their cases are adjudicated. Youth should then be released or transferred to state-run or private placements overseen by the state for rehabilitative treatment. But over the last few years, lengthier court processes and fewer treatment facilities resulted in youth remaining in the Philadelphia Juvenile Justice Services Center (PJJSC) for months prior to placement.¹ While adults receive credit for any time spent in custody—“time served”—youth² do not receive any credit for the time spent in the PJJSC, which we argue is unconstitutional.

This essay sheds light on this issue and proposes arguments to remedy it. First, we discuss the context and process of Philadelphia’s juvenile system that leads to the prolonged detention of youth without credit. Then we propose arguments to challenge this practice through constitutional claims and habeas relief. We conclude with policy proposals to complement these legal challenges. Youth detention is problematic for several reasons, but these proposed remedies are targeted at the specific issue of denying youth credit for time served and ending prolonged detention in Philadelphia.

I. Context Leading to Prolonged Detention Without Credit

The criminal legal system has treated youth differently than adults since the first of many juvenile courts was established in 1899.³ Focusing on rehabilitation, advocates prioritized flexibility while declining to extend the same due process protections that adults receive in criminal court to youth.⁴ The flexible framework aimed to enable the juvenile system’s rehabilitative goals. But the system has since become more punitive without adding sufficient procedural protections. This contributes to youth sometimes spending extended periods of time in youth detention facilities without receiving credit for time already served.

The average length of stay in the PJJSC during the third quarter of fiscal year 2023 was 220 days⁵ —an extraordinary amount of time for a facility intended to house youth only while they wait for their cases to be heard. This section provides an overview of the Philadelphia juvenile-court system.

A. Philadelphia’s Juvenile Court Process

The PJJSC has operated as Philadelphia’s sole secure youth detention facility since 2012.⁶ Since that time, it has struggled with repeated periods of overcrowding, understaffing, and an inability to meet residents’ needs.⁷ The PJJSC has 184 available beds, but its population has at times in recent years far exceeded this capacity, peaking at 242 in June 2023.⁸ From November 1, 2022 to June 9, 2023, the daily population in the PJJSC was below capacity for just one day.⁹ Youth remain in these conditions as their cases work through the juvenile-court system.

Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Act emphasizes that youth should be kept in a family environment whenever possible to achieve the Act’s purposes of imposing “accountability” while also promoting youth development.¹⁰ Nonetheless, many youth charged with crimes in Philadelphia are detained in the PJJSC while they await adjudicatory hearings before juvenile judges.¹¹

Judges make findings about the charges and then can adjudicate the child delinquent and order treatment if needed.¹² The judges balance “the protection of the community, . . . accountability . . . and the development of competencies to enable the child to become a responsible and productive member of the community”¹³ before selecting an appropriate order from a list that includes commitment to state custody.¹⁴ Should a court choose commitment, it must state its reasoning, the type of facility in which the child will be placed, and why it is “best suited to the child’s treatment, supervision, rehabilitation and welfare.”¹⁵

Residential placement facilities provide “treatment” to youth, whereas the PJJSC is only a temporary detention facility.¹⁶ Unlike in adult court, where a person is typically “sentenced” to a specific, determinate amount of time in custody, youth must complete rehabilitative programming and meet certain benchmarks in order to be released from placement, making their commitment—which is analogous to a sentence in adult court—indeterminate.¹⁷

If committed, youth must wait for transfer to a placement facility. At this stage, youth have limited procedural avenues to seek review of their detention.¹⁸ However, numerous procedural protections attach when youth arrive at placement facilities.¹⁹ Juvenile judges are only required to review commitment, not the period prior to placement.²⁰ This leaves pre-transfer, post-adjudication youth in limbo, without protections from the adjudicatory or administrative-review processes. The available post-dispositional motions do not provide effective relief because they must be filed within ten days of the disposition order and appeals must be filed within thirty days;²¹ some youth remain in the PJJSC for much longer. Youth in placement facilities are entitled to dispositional reviews every six months.²² These hearings are designed to ensure the child “is receiving the necessary treatment and services and that the terms and conditions of the disposition are being met.”²³ Even though the same concerns arise in the PJJSC, no analogous protections exist.

II. Rights Denied: No Credit for Time Served

Youth held in the PJJSC may have a cause of action against Philadelphia and state officials for deprivation of constitutional rights.²⁴ These youth can be divided into two categories: (1) those held pre-adjudication,²⁵ including youth charged as adults awaiting decertification to juvenile court; and (2) youth held post-adjudication awaiting transfer to placement facilities. Some youth can argue that under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,²⁶ they have a protected property interest in court-mandated rehabilitative services provided at placement facilities run or overseen by the state. All youth can argue that they have a protected liberty interest in not being detained longer than is reasonable and a right to timely treatment under the substantive due process doctrine. Finally, youth may seek habeas relief for their unlawful detention. The precise mechanisms for relief may seem technical, but the desired outcome of these challenges is less time in punitive custody and a swifter return home.

A. Procedural Due Process Argument

1. Property Interest

Youth are often held for months post-adjudication in the PJJSC without access to treatment and rehabilitative services. This waiting period is supposed to be short; before 2019, the average wait time was twenty days.²⁷ But as of October 2022, the average wait time was four to five months, with some youth waiting much longer.²⁸ By June 2023, post-adjudication youth awaiting placement occupied more than one-third of PJJSC’s 184 beds.²⁹ A § 1983 claim seeking injunctive relief could force state actors to correct these violations by providing services immediately or procedural protections to correct the denial.

To receive constitutional protection, individuals must have a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to property rather than “an abstract need or desire for it.”³⁰ These interests take many forms,³¹ including good-time credits for adults,³² and access to education for children when states create public school systems with required attendance.³³ Property interests do not arise from the Constitution³⁴ but are “created and . . . defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source [of law] . . . .”³⁵

In Pennsylvania, the Juvenile Act³⁶ creates a property interest in rehabilitative services through the procedural mechanisms described above.³⁷ Statutory requirements informing the administration of services signal a protected property interest.³⁸ While the Juvenile Act’s language requires balancing rehabilitative interests with community safety, treatment can override other factors because it is at the core of the Act’s goals.³⁹ Youth receive some procedural protections and, theoretically, the system aims to “rehabilitat[e]” youth and equip them to “contribute”⁴⁰ to the community. The timely provision of these services impacts youths’ economic outlook, heightening the property stakes of every day spent detained post-adjudication. The Act protects access to these services against external forces with language about the Commonwealth’s obligation to meet youths’ needs even in the event of overcrowding.⁴¹

Youth have more than an “abstract need or desire” for these services; they have effectively traded their due process protections for rehabilitative treatment.⁴² Scholars have described the underlying transactional nature of the system as a quid pro quo, and Pennsylvania courts have accepted this view.⁴³ The tradeoff makes the property interest in treatment even more compelling.

Federal courts have recognized property interests arising out of similar federal statutes.⁴⁴ The since-repealed Federal Youth Corrections Act⁴⁵ was designed to treat and rehabilitate “young offenders convicted in federal courts . . . .”⁴⁶ It did so in “blunt terms,” showing that its “major thrust” was “both segregation [from adults] and treatment.”⁴⁷ If a youth was transferred to the adult system, they would receive credit for their time in juvenile detention.⁴⁸ As such, the Act created a constitutionally protected, property-like liberty interest⁴⁹ in treatment.⁵⁰

Accordingly, youth in the PJJSC have a protected property interest in treatment and services. At their adjudication and disposition, youth learn from the state what services and treatment they will receive. Then, they wait for months in the PJJSC, receiving none as their adolescence slips away.⁵¹ The Constitution did not require that Pennsylvania design a separate, rehabilitative system of juvenile justice. Because Pennsylvania did, it is constitutionally required to protect the property interests it has established.⁵²

2. Liberty Interest

The claim for detained youths’ liberty interest follows a similar analysis but extends to both pre- and post-adjudication statuses. The Supreme Court held in Schall v. Martin that pre-trial youth detention does not violate a liberty right when done for a short period of time, with sufficient process, and out of concern for the child’s safety.⁵³ In Schall, the Court focused on specific conditions—youth detained pre-trial wore street clothes, were not regularly punished, stayed for very short periods of time, and were effectively protected from violence⁵⁴ —that simply do not exist in the PJJSC.⁵⁵ A renewed evaluation will show that prolonged detention in the PJJSC violates detained youths’ liberty interests because the situation there is manifestly different than that in Schall.

The Juvenile Act provides routine and procedurally rigorous check-ins on the progress of post-adjudication youth. Judges cannot commit youth to treatment for longer than four years or longer than an adult found guilty of the same offense. Courts cannot extend this detention without timely modification hearings addressing the youth’s progress and treatment needs. Courts only impose probation beyond these limits when balancing public interest and the child’s rehabilitation. Youth may petition for early termination. Liberty is thus measured in time confined. But those protections are denied to post-adjudication youth awaiting transfer to placement facilities. Because current procedures are inadequate to protect the constitutional rights of youth in the PJJSC, courts must determine what additional process is due.

3. The Mathews Test

To protect these liberty and property interests, plaintiffs may demand regular opportunities to appear in front of a judge while awaiting placement in the PJJSC. Under Mathews v. Eldridge, courts must evaluate what process is due by balancing three factors: (1) the individual’s private interests; (2) the risk of error in the procedures; and (3) the implementation costs to the government.⁵⁶ “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”⁵⁷ This is especially true in detention settings.⁵⁸ Courts can and should fashion new procedural requirements to protect youths’ constitutional rights pre-placement.

At these hearings, youth could present evidence of rehabilitation. The judge could then adjust the treatment plan accordingly or order release if they have made adequate progress. While the PJJSC is not a placement facility, many youth still participate in community-run programming.⁵⁹ Juvenile courts have discretion, flexibility, and “considerable power to review and modify the commitment, taking into account the rehabilitative progress” made by the child.⁶⁰ The missing piece is the process needed to facilitate this decision. Youth deserve—and due process requires—the opportunity to present their progress pre-placement and have it considered.

The first Mathews factor—the private interest of children in timely treatment and liberty—deserves significant weight. Treatment helps children re-enter their communities in productive, positive ways. Every day spent in the PJJSC makes re-entry more difficult. Courts have also recognized the importance of youths’ interests in appropriate services and settings in related situations. For example, Pennsylvania youth have a right to appeal transfers from lower- to higher-level security facilities⁶¹ and a right to procedural protections, ensuring that they enter an appropriate school after placement.⁶² Access to appropriate services, educational or otherwise, triggers due process protections because such services are so vital. Youth in the PJJSC have a similar interest, but with higher stakes: a need to move from a setting lacking proper services to one that can provide them.

This process would also reduce the risk of erroneously committing youth to placement for longer than necessary—the second Mathewsfactor. Recently, dispositional orders do not come to fruition until months after judges enter them. The Juvenile Act requires individualized attention and treatment plans. Without more opportunities to hear about detainees’ progress while awaiting placement, the court orders are unlikely to reflect youths’ needs when they arrive in placement. Timing is crucial; for treatment to be effective it must occur as close to the delinquent act as possible.⁶³ Regular opportunities to be heard ensure that the services the Juvenile Act requires are rendered effectively.

Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Commonwealth would face an increased burden if required to provide these procedural protections, but that burden would not be so significant that it outweighs the other factors. When the juvenile system functions as it should, the process is unnecessary, as the injury it protects against only arises as youth suffer long wait times prior to placement. The protections will only materialize when the state’s juvenile justice system deteriorates. At that point, any financial burden ought to be considered self-imposed by state administrators. Further, by reducing unnecessary time spent in custody and incentivizing progress while in the PJJSC, these procedures could reduce the Commonwealth’s financial burden in housing system-involved youth.

These added procedural protections would ultimately help generate a quasi-“time served” award to youth by providing opportunities to be heard and reductions in overall time spent in custody.

B. Substantive Due Process

Plaintiffs also may have a substantive due process right to treatment under Gault and other precedents. Despite the murky status of the substantive due process doctrine,⁶⁴ plaintiffs can argue for a right to treatment in the juvenile system. The Supreme Court has never addressed this issue, but multiple lower courts throughout the 1970s found that such a right exists.⁶⁵ If reinvigorated, this right could remedy prolonged pre-placement detention and provide avenues to improve the quality of services.

When courts began recognizing a right to treatment, they justified their holding by two distinct lines of reasoning. First, in Gault, the Court recognized lower court decisions indicating that “appropriate treatment is essential to the validity of juvenile custody,” creating a pathway for children to challenge their custody if they did not receive appropriate treatment.⁶⁶ Second, in Jackson v. Indiana, the Court addressed the commitment of a criminal defendant incompetent to stand trial, holding that “due process requires the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.”⁶⁷

Circuit courts have split on the issue of a right to rehabilitative treatment.⁶⁸ While treacherous, a path to the right may exist under the Court’s “objectively[] ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’” standard⁶⁹—which is essentially a requirement to survey history in search of the right. As Gault makes clear, the juvenile system has, since its inception, made rehabilitation its primary mission.⁷⁰ “Since the beginning, state courts emphasized the need for ‘treatment’ in their Juvenile Court Acts.”⁷¹

The first juvenile court emerged in 1899, just a few decades after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, and with an explicit vision of rehabilitation and treatment.⁷² But juvenile courts did not emerge in a vacuum: “[T]he deep roots of the idea that the law should treat children differently from adults in American law and democratic theory made the invention of the juvenile court . . . inevitable.”⁷³

Throughout the seventeenth century, legal scholars in England began developing a new understanding of intent and guilt that differentiated between children and adults.⁷⁴ By the time that the U.S. Constitution was ratified, “in the same places where prisons were becoming the standard form of punishment, children began to be distinguished from adults in both kind and place of punishment.”⁷⁵ By the nineteenth century, multiple states had established “houses of refuge” to rehabilitate youth rather than punish them.⁷⁶ By the time Congress ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, separate, reform-oriented institutions for children were the norm.

It must be noted that houses of refuge and reformatories were often traumatic and counterproductive. Although the substantive due process doctrine requires a backwards-facing orientation, advocates do not need to endorse the underlying history. Rather, they can rely on the substantive due process doctrine to argue the right to treatment is deeply rooted, but the treatment itself must be radically updated to reflect contemporary values. This could function as a harm-reduction remedy for detained youth experiencing prolonged detention and provide a basis for challenging conditions in state placements that fail to provide adequate care.

C. Habeas

Children in the PJJSC have various habeas remedies under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to seek release or credit for their time in custody.⁷⁷ There are numerous procedural hurdles to habeas relief that are not covered in this essay.⁷⁸ These habeas petitions would argue that holding youth in custody without credit or rehabilitative services violates the Fourteenth Amendment.⁷⁹ Youths facing extended pre-adjudication detention could argue for release within a certain period if not transferred to a placement facility.

Youths initially charged as adults whose cases have since been decertified to juvenile court have a strong argument in favor of receiving credit for time in custody while awaiting decertification, adjudication, and placement. Pennsylvania law requires that individuals receive credit “for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based.”⁸⁰ Although these youth ultimately end up in juvenile court, they spend time in custody as a result of charges in adult court. As such, they should be entitled to credit for time served.

Moreover, time spent in juvenile detention is time spent “in custody.”⁸¹ In Commonwealth v. Figueroa, Mr. Figueroa was found guilty in an adult court after consenting to the transfer of his cases.⁸² The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that it was “immaterial” that most of his confinement was in a juvenile facility while awaiting disposition of delinquency petitions because he was confined as a result of the conduct on which he was charged and ultimately found guilty.⁸³ The Pennsylvania Superior Court recognized that “both juvenile detention centers and adult prisons address the rehabilitative needs of inmates.”⁸⁴ The Court reasoned that nothing in its jurisprudence supported line drawing between time spent in institutions for “rehabilitative purposes” versus “other purposes,” and ordered that Mr. Figueroa receive time-served credit.⁸⁵

Similar reasoning applies here. Youth initiallycharged as adults, decertified, and adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court should receive credit for time served because they spent time “in custody” in the PJJSC because of charges in adult court. Accordingly, there should be no distinction in the requirement that they “shall be given” credit for time spent “in custody.”⁸⁶

Children adjudicated as delinquent who receive determinative placements have similar habeas arguments. Juvenile judges do not “sentence” youth; rather, they order treatment in some form and subsequently retain jurisdiction to monitor the youths’ progress toward rehabilitation.⁸⁷ Courts are required to hold dispositional review hearings at least every six months.⁸⁸ However, sometimes as part of a negotiated plea, youth receive “determinate” placements. These are adjudications mandating that a youth spend a specific amount of time in juvenile custody. The relief for this category of habeas petitioner would be credit for time served against determinative placements, as these youth already spent significant time “in custody” under Pennsylvania law.⁸⁹

Children adjudicated as delinquent with non-determinative orders requiring compliance with certain rehabilitative treatment prior to release also have a claim for habeas relief.⁹⁰ These youth can argue that their detention is unlawful because it is in violation of the court order for rehabilitation. The remedy for such a violation is either release or cure. To cure the violation, the child would need to receive the required programming as ordered by the court. Alternatively, the Commonwealth could cure this violation by systematically recognizing progress made in the PJJSC and incorporating this progress into the placement facility’s program.

III. Possible Policy and Alternative Advocacy Solutions

While legal challenges create one path to ameliorate the harms of prolonged detention of youth without time served, this strategy should be coupled with policy solutions and other advocacy. This section briefly outlines several changes to compliment the legal strategies described previously. Defense attorneys should advocate for plea deals contemplating time spent in the PJJSC as part of the adjudication. Additionally, lawmakers should credit time served in the PJJSC through legislation. While it is unclear exactly what such a change would look like, legislators can grant time served to youth; support for this this change is potentially picking up momentum, as at least one Philadelphia Councilmember is pushing for such a change.⁹¹ Finally, the City and Commonwealth should reinvest in communities by adequately funding schools and public institutions while promoting restorative and transformative justice alternatives to detention. These changes will reduce harm, empower youth, and lead to increased community safety.

Conclusion

This essay sheds light on how Philadelphia youth are held unconstitutionally in pre-trial detention facilities without receiving time-served credit. It highlights how the prolonged amount of time spent awaiting adjudication and transfer to rehabilitative placement is contrary to the Juvenile Act and the Constitution. Then, it explores various legal challenges for youth detained in the PJJSC to obtain procedural protections against denials of both their liberty and property interests, secure their right to effective treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause, and seek habeas relief to remedy this violation. Youth detention is problematic for many reasons—inadequate conditions and the criminalization of children—but this essay proposes various ways for youth to challenge one of the many injustices that they face daily.

1. Between 2006 and September 2021, fifteen detention facilities terminated operations in Pennsylvania. See Pa. Juv. Ct. Judges’ Comm’n, Pennsylvania Secure Detention Bed Gap Analysis 1 (2023), http://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/jcjc/documents/‌review-documents/pennsylvania%20secure%20detention%20gap%20analysis%20-%20jcjc%20-%20may%202023.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7AT-CMGN]. ↩︎
2. Throughout this paper we use the label “youth” to describe children facing charges in the juvenile and adult systems. We do not use the words “defendant” or “juvenile,” because they carry connotations of criminality and dehumanize individuals. ↩︎
3. [1] See Pa. Juv. Ct. Judges’ Comm’n, Pennsylvania Juvenile Delinquency Benchbook § 3-1 (2024), https://www.pa.gov/‌content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/jcjc/documents/‌publications/juvenile-delinquency-benchbook/pennsylvania%20juvenile%‌20‌delinquency%‌20bench‌book%20revised%202024.pdf [https://perma.cc/ERV8-USQ8] (chronicling the development of the juvenile court movement beginning in 1899); see also Sonja Marrett, Note, Beyond Rehabilitation: Constitutional Violations Associated with the Isolation and Discrimination of Transgender Youth in the Juvenile Justice System, 58 B.C. L. Rev. 351, 352 (2017) (describing the lack of protections for incarcerated LGBT youth). ↩︎
4. See Shana Conklin, Juveniles Locked in Limbo: Why Pretrial Detention Implicates a Fundamental Right, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 2150, 2154 (2012) (“When the juvenile court was established, Progressive reformers did not envision the need for due process safeguards.”); David N. Sandberg, Resolving the Gault Dilemma, 48 N.H. Bar J. 58, 58 (2007) (identifying the tension of incorporating formal rights into the informal juvenile courts); Michele Benedetto Neitz, A Unique Bench, A Common Code: Evaluating Judicial Ethics in Juvenile Court, 24 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 97, 103 (2011) (describing the concern that the high degree of judicial discretion in the juvenile court setting could deny juveniles due process). In the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court clarified which rights extended to youth and which did not. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 552-54 (1966) (holding juvenile court could not disregard Kent’s statutorily conferred right to a hearing before waiver into adult court); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 36, 47 (1967) (holding youth have the right to counsel, adequate notice of a hearing, written notice of a parent/guardian, and the right against self-incrimination); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (determining the due process clause entitles youth to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for a criminal conviction). The Pennsylvania legislature codified certain rights for youth accused of crimes by passing the Juvenile Act of 1972. See Pa. Juv. Ct. Judges’ Comm’n, supra note 3, § 3-1 (“[T]he Juvenile Act of 1972 codified the rights of accused juveniles to receive written notice of charges against them, to be assisted by counsel, to confront accusers, and to be convicted only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”); see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (finding youth do not have a right to a jury trial). ↩︎
5. Right to Know Responsive Records Email from Feige M. Grundman, Chief Deputy City Solic., Right to Know Unit, City of Phila. L. Dep’t to authors (Oct. 30, 2023) (on file with authors) (“The average length of stay for youth who left the PJJSC during FY23, Q3 was 220 days.”). While not this essay’s focus, it is essential to keep in mind that youth of color are disproportionately represented in the PJJSC. See id. (“Over 4 in 5 (82%) juvenile justice-involved youth were Black.”). ↩︎
6. Previously, the Youth Study Center was the sole secure youth pre-adjudication facility. See Patrick Griffin, Juvenile Detention: The Philadelphia Alternative, Pa. Progress, July 2003, at 1 (describing that the Youth Study Center was the only option for housing youth pre-adjudication until a new facility was established). It was “chronically overcrowded,” and its then executive director admitted that its conditions were a deterrent to security. Id. These conditions continued through the 1990s and 2000s, leading to plans for the “state-of-the-art” replacement in West Philadelphia—the PJJSC. Id. ↩︎
7. See, e.g., Ellie Rushing & Samantha Melamed, City Says Photos Point to Juvenile Crisis, Phila. Inquirer, Oct. 29, 2023, at A12 (containing images depicting children sleeping on benches and the floor in the PJJSC). City officials commenced litigation to force the state to accept youth committed to placement as a remedy. See generally City of Phila. v. Dep’t of Hum. Serv. of Pa., No. 516 M.D. 2022 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 24, 2023). ↩︎
8. See Petitioner’s Application for Special Relief in the Form of a Preliminary Injunction at 10, City of Phila. v. Dep’t of Hum. Serv. of Pa., No. 516 M.D. 2022 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 9, 2023) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Application]. ↩︎
9. City of Phila. v. Dep’t of Hum. Serv., mem. op. at 25 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 20, 2023). ↩︎
10. See Juvenile Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6301(b). ↩︎
11. See Juveniles, Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, https://phillyda.org/‌juveniles/ [http://‌perma.cc/LT4C-F3XQ] (“Depending on the circumstances of the criminal allegations, after arrest, a young person may either go home under the supervision of their family or may be held at the [PJJSC] until their detention hearing.”). These hearings are like criminal trials, with the judge making a final decision about charges in all cases. Id. ↩︎
12. See id. ↩︎
13. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6352(a). ↩︎
14. See id. § 6352(a)(3) (noting that children may be committed to various facilities under the supervision of the state). ↩︎
15. Id. § 6352(c). ↩︎
16. See Petitioner’s Application, supra note 8, at 4. ↩︎
17. See supra note 11 (describing how a judge may send a youth to residential placement, but once they show they are no longer a safety concern, the facility recommends discharge). ↩︎
18. Habeas relief may be available at this stage. See infra Section II.C. ↩︎
19. See, e.g., In re C.K.M., 279 A.3d 610, 613 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022) (holding that statutory time limitations apply to a child’s initial commitment period). ↩︎
20. See supra note 11. ↩︎
21. Pa. R. Juv. Ct. Proc. 620. ↩︎
22. See Commonwealth v. J.C., 199 A.3d 394, 399 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (describing the requirements in § 6353 of the Juvenile Act that require a child’s commitment is reviewed regularly with notice and opportunity to be heard). ↩︎
23. Pa. R. Juv. Ct. Proc. 610(A). ↩︎
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing a basis for civil action for the deprivation of human rights); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (providing avenue for relief in federal courts where an individual is held improperly in state custody). ↩︎
25. See generally Petitioner’s Application, supra note 8. The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of pre-trial detention for youth in 1984. See generally Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984); infra notes 53–54. ↩︎
26. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”). ↩︎
27. Anna Orso, Philadelphia Sues State of Pennsylvania Over Crowded Juvenile Detention Facility, Phila. Inquirer (Oct. 24, 2022, 3:29 PM), https://www.inquirer.com/‌politics/‌philadelphia/‌philadelphia-sues-pennsylvania-overcrowded-juvenile-facility-20221024.html [http://www.perma.cc/84ET-RW87]. ↩︎
28. Id. ↩︎
29. See Petitioner’s Application, supra note 8, at 8 (“Incredibly, youth who have already been adjudicated and are awaiting placement at a Commonwealth facility occupy more than a third of the PJJSC’s 184-beds licensed capacity.”) ↩︎
30. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). ↩︎
31. See id. (describing the amorphous development of property interests). ↩︎
32. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974) (discussing good time credits as a property interest with constitutional protections). ↩︎
33. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (discussing how due process applies to the suspension process for students). ↩︎
34. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. ↩︎
35. Id. ↩︎
36. See generally Juvenile Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6301, et seq. (1976).
    [1] See supra Section I.A. ↩︎
37. See supra Section I.A. ↩︎
38. See Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 195-96 (3d Cir. 2009) (suggesting that procedural protections to special education access signals a protected property interest). ↩︎
39. See In Interest of D.C.D., 171 A.3d 727, 739 (Pa. 2017) (allowing discharge of youth whose rehabilitative needs could not be met at a secure facility, over protestations of community safety). ↩︎
40. Id. at 739, 742. ↩︎
41. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6353(c) (“If the population at a particular institution or program exceeds 110% of capacity, the department shall notify the courts and the General Assembly that intake to that institution or program is temporarily closed and shall make available equivalent services to children in equivalent facilities.” (emphasis added)). ↩︎
42. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). ↩︎
43. See Janet D. v. Carros, 362 A.2d 1060, 1072 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (“Because the purpose of juvenile acts is to provide treatment, not punishment, it has been held that a child will not be accorded the procedural rights implied in a criminal proceeding.”). ↩︎
44. See Micklus v. Carlson, 632 F.2d 227, 239 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding a cause of action due to the liberty interest created by 18 U.S.C. § 5011). ↩︎
45. 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (repealed 1984). ↩︎
46. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 433 (1974); see also Lewis v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 878 F.2d 714, 716 (3d Cir. 1989) (“The core purpose of the YCA is rehabilitation.”). ↩︎
47. Micklus, 632 F.2d at 237. ↩︎
48. See Lewis, 878 F.2d at 723 (ordering that the incarcerated individual receives good time credits for time served since being sentenced as an adult). ↩︎
49. While this case was a Bivens action, Micklus, 632 F.2d at 239, that located the right in the Fifth Amendment, the analyses under the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments are identical for a § 1983 claim. ↩︎
50. Micklus, 632 F.2d at 239. ↩︎
51. See Commonwealth v. Dallenbach, 729 A.2d 1218, 1220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (describing how, due to “changes and rapid development, children experience an acceleration in the passage of time so that . . . one year may seem to be five”). ↩︎
52. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 574 (finding a state’s decision to create a mandatory education system creates constitutional protections for students even if that system is not constitutionally mandated). ↩︎
53. 467 U.S. 253, 266-81 (1984). ↩︎
54. Id. Specifically, the Court noted approvingly that youth were held for a maximum of 17 days. Id. at 270. As discussed at supra note 5 and accompanying text, the average length of stay at PJJSC has recently topped 200 days. ↩︎
55. See Pat Loeb, Teens in Philadelphia’s Overcrowded Juvenile Justice System Tell of Terror on the Inside, KYW News Radio (Oct. 31, 2022), https://www.audacy.com/‌kywnewsradio/‌news/‌local/philadelphia-juvenile-justice-overcrowded-terror [https://perma.cc/ZR4G-WJZU] (describing the physical violence in the PJJSC); see also Rushing & Melamed, supra note 7 (showing images of children sleeping on benches and the floor in the PJJSC). ↩︎
56. See 424 U.S. 319, 341, 343, 347 (1976). ↩︎
57. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). ↩︎
58. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978) (acknowledging the court’s power to order rectification of constitutional violations in a prison setting); see also Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 511 (2011) (“Courts may not allow constitutional violations to continue simply because a remedy would involve intrusion into the realm of prison administration.”). ↩︎
59. See yasprojectphilly (@yasprojectphilly), Instagram (Nov. 11, 2022), https://‌www.‌instagram.‌com/‌yasprojectphilly/p/Ck1VsY1J_3Y/ [https://perma.cc/RDH3-49DM] (describing how the Youth Art and Self-Empowerment Project runs workshops for youth in the PJJSC). ↩︎
60. In re Love, 646 A.2d 1233, 1238 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). ↩︎
61. See In re D.S.M., No. 612 WDA 2022, 2023 WL 3614721, at *3 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 23, 2023) (describing the procedural history of appellant’s appeal). ↩︎
62. D.C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 879 A.2d 408, 419 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (holding that students challenging their assignment to an alternative education setting require procedural due process). ↩︎
63. See Commonwealth v. Dallenbach, 729 A.2d 1218, 1220 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (“To ensure successful rehabilitation, the reformation program . . . must commence within a reasonable time of the child’s delinquent act so that the child can comprehend the consequences of his act and the need for reform.”). ↩︎
64. See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2247 (2022) (questioning substantive due process); see also id. at 2301 (Thomas J., concurring) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not secure any substantive rights[.]”). ↩︎
65. Pennsylvania courts declined to find a constitutional right to rehabilitative treatment, but found that such a right stems from the Juvenile Act. See Janet D. v. Carros, 362 A.2d 1060, 1072 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (“In the present case, whether appellee had a constitutional right to treatment need not be decided; the right was given to her by the Juvenile Act.”); see also infra note 68 (discussing circuit split on this issue). ↩︎
66. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 n.30 (1967) (citations omitted). ↩︎
67. 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). ↩︎
68. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 358 (7th Cir. 1974) (“We hold . . . that juveniles have a right to rehabilitative treatment.”); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (“In sum, the law has developed to a point which justifies the assertion that: ‘A new concept of substantive due process is evolving in the therapeutic realm. This concept is founded upon a recognition of the concurrency between the state’s exercise of sanctioning powers and its assumption of the duties of social responsibility. Its implication is that effective treatment must be the quid pro quo for society’s right to exercise its parens patriae controls. Whether specifically recognized by statutory enactment or implicitly derived from the constitutional requirements of due process, the right to treatment exists.’” (citation omitted)); Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 175 (E.D. Tex. 1973) (finding youth in the Texas Youth Council’s custody have a state statutory and federal constitutional “right to treatment”); Inmates of Boys’ Training Sch. v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1364 (D.R.I. 1972) (“Thus due process in the juvenile justice system requires that the post-adjudicative stage of institutionalization further this goal of rehabilitation.”). But see Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1177 (1st Cir. 1983) (stating that while rehabilitative training is desirable, “plaintiffs have no constitutional right to that rehabilitative training”). ↩︎
69. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-721 (1997); see also Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. at 2247 (“Historical inquiries of this nature are essential whenever we are asked to recognize a new component of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause because the term ‘liberty’ alone provides little guidance.”). ↩︎
70. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16 (“The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalties, and by the fact that children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with hardened criminals . . . . The child was to be ‘treated’ and ‘rehabilitated’ and the procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be ‘clinical’ rather than punitive.”). ↩︎
71. Nelson, 491 F.2d at 358-359 (citing Wis. Indus. Sch. for Girls v. Clark Cnty., 79 N.W. 422 (Wis. 1899); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198 (Pa. 1905); Ex parte Sharp, 96 P. 563 (Idaho 1908); Wissenberg v. Bradley, 229 N.W. 205 (Iowa 1930)). ↩︎
72. See Pa. Juv. Ct. Judges’ Comm’n, supra note 3, § 3.2 (chronicling the beginning of the first juvenile court). ↩︎
73. David S. Tanenhaus, The Elusive Juvenile Court: Its Origins, Practices, and ReInventions, in The Oxford Handbook of Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice 434 (Donna M. Bishop & Barry C. Feld eds., 2011). ↩︎
74. See Holly Brewer, By Birth or Consent: Children, Law, and the Anglo-American Revolution in Authority 213-14 (2005) (describing how judges began to focus on determining guilt in the late eighteenth century). ↩︎
75. Id. at 229. ↩︎
76. See Frank W. Nicholas, History, Philosophy, and Procedures of Juvenile Courts, 1 J. Fam. L. 151, 155 (1961) (describing how New York City had a House of Refuge in 1825 and Pennsylvania followed suit in 1826); Stanford J. Fox, A Contribution to the History of the American Juvenile Court, 49 Juv. & Fam. Ct. J. 7, 8 (1998) (describing how by 1862 Illinois had established reform schools); Tanenhaus, supra note 73, at 421 (describing how by the 1830s, as nearly every state began building penitentiaries, they also began building separate Houses of Refuge to “separate juveniles from adult offenders”). ↩︎
77. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (detailing available remedies under the statute). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) mandates people exhaust state court remedies before filing their habeas petitions in federal court. Id. § 2254(b)(1)(A). ↩︎
78. These hurdles include (1) exhaustion of state court remedies, which requires analyzing what must be exhausted in a juvenile proceeding specifically (adjudication v. conviction and what rights are waived in plea negotiations or decertification negotiations); and (2) timeline because, even if delayed, a youth’s case may not be so delayed that they can benefit from habeas relief. Another issue is whether youth can pursue a class action habeas petition thereby benefiting all similarly situated youth. While beyond the scope of this essay, these issues would benefit from further exploration. ↩︎
79. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. ↩︎
80. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9760(1). ↩︎
81. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Figueroa, No. 1084 MDA 2017, 2018 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2153, at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (citing Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908, 914 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), appeal denied, 827 A.2d 430 (Pa. 2003)) (“The ordinary meaning of ‘in custody’ includes confinement in a juvenile detention facility.”); Commonwealth v. Hubert, 430 A.2d 1160, 1161 (Pa. 1981) (The defendant “was a [16-year-old] . . . being held in custody at a juvenile detention center.”)). See generally National Partnership for Juvenile Services, Desktop Guide to Quality Practice for Working with Youth in Confinement (2015) (discussing how individuals in juvenile detention centers are in custody). ↩︎
82. Figueroa, 2018 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2153, at *2. ↩︎
83. Id. at *3-4. ↩︎
84. Id. at *6. ↩︎
85. Id. at *6-7. ↩︎
86. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9760(1). ↩︎
87. See Pa. R. Juv. Ct. Proc. 409 (outlining the court’s role in determining the course of action for delinquent youth); see also id. at 610 (describing the process of youth dispositional review hearings). ↩︎
88. Id. at 610. ↩︎
89. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9760; Figueroa, 2018 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2153, at *6-7. ↩︎
90. This claim would be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Youth should argue they are “in custody” under Pennsylvania law and for purposes of habeas eligibility. They can challenge the imposition of their sentence as unconstitutional because of the delayed start. As described above, there are no other procedural mechanisms for youth to receive revaluations of custody while awaiting transfer to placement. ↩︎
91. See Sean Collins Walsh & Anna Orso, Philly Lawmakers Will Probe Traffic Deaths and Hit-and-Runs Following High-Profile Crashes; Council Roundup, Phila. Inquirer (Nov. 16, 2023), https://www.inquirer.com/politics/philadelphia/council-investigate-pedestrian-car-hit-and-runs-vision-zero-20231116.html [http://perma.cc/Z8BV-YSWR] (detailing the passage of a resolution to address the reform of the PJJSC). ↩︎